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Abstract
We study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer with a valuation drawn from
an unknown distribution D. The seller has “data” about D in the form of m ≥ 1 i.i.d. samples,
and the algorithmic challenge is to use these samples to obtain expected revenue as close as
possible to what could be achieved with advance knowledge of D.
Our first set of results quantifies the number of samples m that are necessary and sufficient
to obtain a (1− )-approximation. For example, for an unknown distribution that satisfies the
monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition, we prove that Θ˜(−3/2) samples are necessary and suf-
ficient. Remarkably, this is fewer samples than is necessary to accurately estimate the expected
revenue obtained for such a distribution by even a single reserve price. We also prove essentially
tight sample complexity bounds for regular distributions, bounded-support distributions, and a
wide class of irregular distributions. Our lower bound approach, which applies to all randomized
pricing strategies, borrows tools from differential privacy and information theory, and we believe
it could find further applications in auction theory.
Our second set of results considers the single-sample case. While no deterministic pricing
strategy is better than 12 -approximate for regular distributions, for MHR distributions we show
how to do better: there is a simple deterministic pricing strategy that guarantees expected
revenue at least 0.589 times the maximum possible. We also prove that no deterministic pricing
strategy achieves an approximation guarantee better than e4 ≈ .68.
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1 Introduction
We study the basic pricing problem of making an “optimal” take-it-or-leave-it price to a potential
buyer with an unknown willingness-to-pay (a.k.a. valuation). Offering a price of p to a buyer with
valuation v yields revenue p if v ≥ p, and 0 otherwise. The traditional approach in theoretical
computer science to such problems is to assume as little as possible about the buyer’s valuation
— for example, only lower and upper bounds on its value — and to compare the performance
of different prices using worst-case analysis. The traditional approach in economics is to assume
that the buyer’s valuation is drawn from a distribution D that is known to the seller, and to use
average-case analysis. In the latter case, the optimal solution is clear — it is the monopoly price
maxp≥0 p · (1− F (p)), where F is the CDF of D.
Cole and Roughgarden [9] recently proposed adapting the formalism of learning theory [23] to
interpolate between the traditional worst- and average-case approaches, in the context of single-item
auction design. The idea is to parameterize a seller’s knowledge about an unknown distribution D
through a number m of i.i.d. samples from D. When m = 0 this is equivalent to the worst-case
approach, and as m → ∞ it becomes equivalent to the average-case approach. The benchmark
is the maximum expected revenue obtainable when the distribution D is known a priori. The
algorithmic challenge is to use the m samples from D to get expected revenue as close to this
benchmark as possible, no matter what the underlying distribution D is.1
This “hybrid” model offers several benefits. First, it is a relatively faithful model of many
realistic computer science applications, where data from the past is assumed to be a reasonable
proxy for future inputs and guides the choice of an algorithm. For example, in Yahoo!’s keyword
auctions, the choice of reserve prices is guided by past bid data in a natural way [19]. Second, the
model is a potential “sweet spot” between worst-case and average-case analysis, inheriting much
of the robustness of the worst-case model (since we demand guarantees for every underlying D)
while allowing very good approximation guarantees with respect to a strong benchmark. Third, by
analyzing the trade-offs between the number of samples m available from D and the best-possible
worst-case approximation guarantee, the analysis framework implicitly quantifies the value of data
(i.e., of additional samples). It becomes possible, for example, to make statements like “4 times
as much data improves our revenue guarantee from 80% to 90%.” Finally, proving positive results
in this model involves rigorously justifying natural methods of incorporating past data into an
algorithm, and this task is interesting in its own right.
1.1 Our Results
Formally, we study a single seller of some good, and a single buyer with a private valuation v for
the good drawn from an unknown distribution D. The seller has access to m ≥ 1 i.i.d. samples
v1, . . . , vm from D. The goal is to identify, among all m-pricing strategies — functions from a sample
v1, . . . , vm to a price p — the strategy that has the highest expected revenue. The expectation here
is over m + 1 i.i.d. draws from D — the samples v1, . . . , vm and the unknown valuation v of the
buyer — and the randomness of the pricing strategy. The approximation guarantee of a pricing
strategy p(·) for a set D of distributions is its worst-case (over D) approximation of the (optimal)
expected revenue obtained by the monopoly price:
inf
D∈D
Ev1,...,vm∼D[p(v1, . . . , vm) · (1− F (p(v1, . . . , vm)))]
maxp p(1− F (p)) ,
1There are, of course, other ways one can parameterize partial knowledge about valuations. See e.g. Azar et al.
[2], Chiesa et al. [8] for alternative approaches.
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Upper Bound Lower Bound
MHR O(−3/2 log −1) (Thm. 3.1) Ω(−3/2) (Thm. 4.12)
Regular O(−3 log −1) ([11]) Ω(−3) (Thm. 4.8)
General O(δ−1−2 log(δ−1−1)) (Thm. 3.5) Ω(δ−1−2) (Thm. 4.6)
Bounded Support O(H−2 log(H−1)) (Thm. 3.6 and [4]) Ω(H−2) (Thm. 4.7)
Table 1: Sample complexity of a (1 − )-approximation. For bounded-support distributions, the
support is a subset of [1, H]. For general distributions, the benchmark is the optimal revenue of
prices with sale probability at least δ.
where F is the CDF of D.
We first describe our results that quantify the inherent trade-off between the number of sam-
ples m and the best-possible approximation guarantee of an m-pricing strategy; see also Table 1.
Some restriction on the class D of allowable distributions is necessary for the existence of pricing
strategies with any non-trivial approximation of the optimal expected revenue.2 We give essen-
tially tight bounds on the number of samples that are necessary and sufficient to achieve a target
approximation of 1− , for all of the choices of the class D that are common in auction theory. For
example, when D is the set of distributions that satisfy the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condi-
tion3, we prove that m = Ω(−3/2) samples are necessary and that m = O(−3/2 log −1) samples
are sufficient to achieve an approximation guarantee of 1− .4 This bound holds more generally for
the class of “α-strongly regular distributions” introduced in Cole and Roughgarden [9] (for fixed
α > 0). When D is the (larger) set of regular distributions5, we prove that the sample complexity
is Θ˜(−3). When D is the set of arbitrary distributions with support contained in [1, H], the sample
complexity is Θ˜(H−2). We also give essentially optimal sample complexity bounds for distribu-
tions that are parameterized by the probability of a sale at the monopoly price; see Section 1.2 for
more discussion. On the upper bound side, our primary contribution is the bound for MHR and
strongly regular distributions.6 All of our lower bounds, which are information-theoretic and apply
to arbitrary randomized pricing strategies, are new.
Our second set of results considers the regime where the seller has only one sample (m = 1)
and wants to use it in the optimal deterministic way.7 Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] observed that an
elegant result from auction theory, the Bulow-Klemperer theorem on auctions vs. negotiations [6],
implies that the 1-sample pricing strategy p(v) = v has an approximation guarantee of 12 when D
is the set of regular distributions.8 It is not hard to prove that there is no better deterministic
pricing strategy for this set of distributions. We show how to do better, however, when D is the
2The family of distributions that take on a value M with probability 1
M
and 0 with probability 1 − 1
M
highlight
the difficulty.
3D satisfies the monotone hazard condition if f(v)
1−F (v) is nondecreasing; see Section 2 for details.
4We suppress only universal constant factors, which do not depend on the specific distribution D ∈ D. Such
uniform sample complexity bounds are desirable because the valuation distribution is unknown. Law of Large
Numbers-type arguments do not generally give uniform bounds.
5D is regular if the “virtual valuation function” v − 1−F (v)
f(v)
is non-decreasing; see Section 2 for details.
6The upper bound for regular distributions was proved in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] and the upper bound for
bounded valuations can be deduced from Balcan et al. [4].
7We offer the problems of determining the best randomized pricing strategy for m = 1 and the best way to use a
small m ≥ 2 number of samples as challenging and exciting directions for future work.
8Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] observed this in the context of the design and analysis of prior-independent auc-
tions. Plugging our better bounds for single-sample pricing starategies with MHR distributions into the framework
of Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] immediately yields analogously better prior-independent mechanisms.
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Positive Result Negative Result
Regular ≥ 0.5 ([6, 11]) ≤ 0.5 (Thm. 6.1)
MHR ≥ 0.589 (Thm. 5.1) ≤ 0.68 (Thm. 6.3)
Table 2: Optimal approximation ratio with a single sample.
smaller set of MHR distributions: a simple 1-pricing strategy of the form p(v) = cv for some c < 1
has an approximation guarantee of 0.589. We also prove that no deterministic 1-pricing strategy
is better than an e4 -approximation for MHR distributions, and that no continuously differentiable
such strategy is better than a 0.677-approximation.
1.2 A Few Technical Highlights
This section singles out a few of our results and techniques that seem especially useful or motivating
for follow-up work. First, recall that we prove that O(−3/2 log −1) samples from an unknown MHR
distribution — or more generally, an unknown α-strongly regular distribution [9] — are sufficient
to achieve expected revenue at least 1 −  times that of the monoply price. Remarkably, this
is fewer than the ≈ −2 samples necessary to accurately estimate the expected revenue obtained
by even a single fixed price for such a distribution!9 In this sense, we prove that near-optimal
revenue-maximization is strictly easier than accurately learning even very simple statistics of the
underlying distribution. The most important idea in our upper bound is that, because of the
structure of the revenue-maximization problem, the estimation errors of different competing prices
are usefully correlated. For example, if the estimated expected revenue of the true monopoly price
is significantly less than its actual expected revenue (because of a higher-than-expected number
of low samples), then this probably also holds for prices that are relatively close to the monopoly
price. Moreover, these are precisely the incorrect prices that an algorithm is most likely to choose by
mistake. The second ingredient is the fact that MHR distributions have strongly concave “revenue
curves,” and this limits how many distinct prices can achieve expected revenue close to that of the
monopoly price.
Second, recall that we prove essentially matching lower bounds for all of our sample complexity
upper bounds. For example, there is no (1 − )-approximate pricing strategy (deterministic or
randomized) for MHR distributions when m = o(−3/2) or for regular distributions when m =
o(−3). For both of these lower bounds, we reduce the existence of a (1 − )-optimal pricing
strategy to that of a classifier that distinguishes between two similar distributions. We borrow
methodology from the differential privacy literature to construct two distributions with small KL
divergence and disjoint sets of near-optimal prices, and use Pinsker’s inequality to derive the final
sample complexity lower bounds. This lower bound approach is novel in the context of auction
theory and we expect it to find further applications.
Third, we offer a simple and novel approach for reasoning about irregular distributions. We
noted above the problematic irregular distributions that place a very low probability on a very high
value. Regularity can also fail for more “reasonable” distributions, such as mixtures of common
distributions. In Section 3.3, we consider a benchmark R∗δ defined as the maximum expected revenue
achievable for the underlying distribution using a price that sells with probability at least δ, and
9It is well known (e.g. Anthony and Bartlett [1, Lemma 5.1]) that, given a coin that either has bias 1
2
− or bias 1
2
+,
Ω(−2 log 1
δ
) coin flips are necessary to distinguish between the two cases with probability at least 1 − δ. The lower
bound is information-theoretic and applies to arbitrarily sophisticated learning methods. This sample complexity
lower bound translates straightforwardly to the problem of estimating, by any means, the expected revenue of a fixed
price for an unknown MHR distribution up to a factor of (1± ).
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prove essentially tight sample complexity bounds for approximating this benchmark. As a special
case, if for every distribution in D the monopoly price sells with probability at least δ — as is
the case for sufficiently small δ and typical “reasonable” distributions, even irregular ones — then
approximating R∗δ is equivalent to approximating the optimal revenue. Even if not all distributions
of D satisfy this property, this benchmark enables parameterized sample complexity bounds that do
not require blanket distributional restrictions such as regularity. We believe that this parameterized
approach will find more applications.10
1.3 Further Related Work
We already mentioned the related work of Cole and Roughgarden [9]; the present work follows the
same formalism. Specializing the results in Cole and Roughgarden [9] to the sample complexity
questions that we study here yields much weaker results than the ones we prove — only a lower
bound of −1/2 and an upper bound of −c for a large constant c. Two of the upper bounds in
Table 2 follow from previous work. The upper bound of O(−3 log −1) for regular distributions
was proved in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11]. (They also proved a bound of O(−2 log −1) for MHR
distributions, which is subsumed by our nearly tight bound of O(−3/2 log −1).) The upper bound
of O(H−2 logH−1) for bounded valuations can be deduced from Balcan et al. [4].11 We em-
phasize that, in addition to our new upper bound results in the large-sample regime, there is no
previous work on sample complexity lower bounds for our pricing problem nor on the best-possible
approximation given a single sample.
There are many less related previous works that also use the idea of independent samples in
the context of auction design. For example, some previous works study the asymptotic (in the
number of samples) convergence of an auction’s revenue to the optimal revenue, without providing
any uniform sample complexity bounds. See Neeman [18], Segal [21], Baliga and Vohra [5], and
Goldberg et al. [14] for several examples. Some recent and very different uses of samples in auction
design include Fu et al. [13], who use samples to extend the Cre´mer and McLean [10] theorem to
partially known valuation distributions, and Chawla et al. [7], who design auctions that both have
near-optimal revenue and enable accurate inference about the valuation distribution from samples.
2 Preliminaries
Suppose the buyer’s value is drawn from a publicly known distribution D whose support is a
continuous interval. Let F be the c.d.f. of D. If F is differentiable, let f be the p.d.f. of D. Let
q(v) = 1− F (v) be the quantile of value v, i.e., the sale probability of reserve price v. Let v(q) be
the value with quantile q.
The first set of distributions we study are those satisfying standard small-tail assumptions such
as regularity, monotone hazard rate, and α-strong regularity [9]. We explain these assumptions in
more detail next. For these distributions, we assume F is differentiable and f exists.
10See e.g. Hartline and Roughgarden [15, Appendix D], Hartline [17, Chapter 4], and Sivan and Syrgkanis [22] for
alternative approaches to parameterizing irregularity.
11The paper by Balcan et al. [4] studies a seemingly different problem — the design of digital good auctions with
n buyers in a prior-free setting (with bounded valuations). But if one instantiates their model with bidders with
i.i.d. valuations from a distribution D, then their performance analysis of their RSO mechanism essentially gives a
performance guarantee for the empirical monopoly price for D with n/2 samples, relative to the expected revenue of
the monopoly price with a single bidder.
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Let R(q) = qv(q) be the revenue as a function over the quantile space. We have
R′(q) = v(q) + q
dv
dq
= v − q(v)
f(v)
.
The virtual valuation function is defined to be φ(v) = v − 1−F (v)f(v) = R′(q). A distribution D is
regular if for all value v in its support,
dφ
dv
≥ 0 . (1)
Note that v(q) is decreasing in q. A distribution is regular iff R′(q) = φ(v) is decreasing in q and,
thus, R(q) is concave. So R(q) is maximized when R′(q) = φ(v(q)) = 0. Let q∗ and v∗ = v(q∗) be
the revenue-optimal quantile and reserve price respectively.
A distribution D has monotone hazard rate (MHR) if for all values v in its support,
dφ
dv
≥ 1 . (2)
Lemma 2.1 (Hartline et al. [16]). For every MHR distribution, q∗ ≥ 1e .
Cole and Roughgarden [9] defined α-strong regular distributions to interpolate between (1) and
(2):
dφ
dv
≥ α . (3)
Many properties of MHR distributions carry over to α-strongly regular distributions with different
constants. For example:
Lemma 2.2 (Cole and Roughgarden [9]). For any α-strongly regular distribution, q∗ ≥ α1/(1−α).
To reason about general (irregular) distributions, we require an alternative benchmark (recall
the Introduction). We propose
R∗δ = max
q≥δ
qv(q) ,
the optimal revenue if we only consider reserve prices with sale probability at least δ. Here, we
expect the sample complexity to depend on both  and δ.
3 Asymptotic Upper Bounds
We now present our positive results in the asymptotic regime.
Definition 3.1. Given m samples v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vm, the empirical reserve is
arg max
i≥1
i · vi.
If we only consider i ≥ cm for some parameter c, it is called the c-guarded empirical reserve.
5
3.1 MHR Upper Bound
We next prove the following.
Theorem 3.1. The empirical reserve with m = Θ(−3/2 log −1) samples is (1− )-approximate for
all MHR distributions.
We also give a matching lower bound (up to the log factor) in Section 4.
For simplicity of presentation, we prove Theorem 3.1 for the 1e -guarded empirical reserve. (Recall
that q∗ ≥ 1e for MHR distributions.) The unguarded version is similar but requires some extra care
on the small quantiles.
To show Theorem 3.1, we use two properties of MHR distributions. First, the optimal quantile
of an MHR distribution is at least e−1 (Lemma 2.1). Second, the revenue decreases quadratically
in how much the reserve price deviates from the optimal one in quantile space, which we formulate
as the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For any 0 ≤ q′ ≤ 1, we have R(q∗)−R(q′) ≥ 14(q∗ − q′)2R(q∗).
Proof. There are three cases depending on the relation between q′ and q∗: q′ > q∗, q′ = q∗, and
q′ < q∗. The second case, i.e., q′ = q∗, is trivial. Next, we prove the other two cases separately.
First, consider the case when q′ > q∗. By the optimality of q∗, for any q s.t. q∗ ≤ q ≤ q′, we
have qv(q) ≤ q∗v(q∗) and, thus,
v(q) ≤ q
∗
q
v(q∗)
Further, by the MHR assumption that dφ(v)dv ≥ 1, for any q∗ ≤ q ≤ q′, we have
φ(v(q)) ≤ φ(v(q∗)) + v(q)− v(q∗) = v(q)− v(q∗)
Combining with the above inequality that lower bounds v(q), we get that
φ(v(q)) ≤ q
∗ − q
q
v(q∗)
Therefore, we get that
R(q∗)−R(q′) =
∫ q′
q∗
−R′(q)dq =
∫ q′
q∗
−φ(v(q))dq ≥
∫ q′
q∗
q − q∗
q
v(q∗)dq
Note that q−q
∗
q ≥ 0 for any q′ ≤ q ≤ q∗. Moreover, for any q ≥ q
′+q∗
2 , we have
q−q∗
q ≥ q
′−q∗
q′+q∗ . Hence,
we further drive the following inequality
R(q∗)−R(q′) ≥
∫ q′
q′+q∗
2
q′ − q∗
q′ + q∗
v(q∗)dq =
(q′ − q∗)2
2(q′ + q∗)
v(q∗) =
(q′ − q∗)2
2q∗(q′ + q∗)
R(q∗) .
Then lemma then follows from that 0 ≤ q′, q∗ ≤ 1.
Next, we consider the case when q′ < q∗. The high-level proof idea of this case is similar to the
previous case, but requires some subtle changes in the inequalities. For completeness, we include
the proof below
By concavity of the revenue curve, for any q′ ≤ q ≤ q∗, we have
qv(q) ≥ q − q
′
q∗ − q′ q
∗v(q∗) +
q∗ − q
q∗ − q′ q
′v(q′) .
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Dividing both sides by q, we have
v(q) ≥ q
∗v(q∗)− q′v(q′)
q∗ − q′ +
q∗q′
q(q∗ − q′)
(
v(q′)− v(q∗)).
Further, by the MHR assumption,
φ(v(q)) ≥ φ(v(q∗)) + v(q)− v(q∗) = v(q)− v(q∗) .
Note that the direction of the inequality is the opposite of its counterpart in the previous case.
This is because we have v(q) > v(q∗) in this case (as oppose to v(q) < v(q∗) as in the previous
case.) Combining with the above inequality that lower bounds v(q), we get that
φ(v(q)) ≥ q
∗v(q∗)− q′v(q′)
q∗ − q′ +
q∗q′
q(q∗ − q′)
(
v(q′)− v(q∗))− v(q∗)
=
q′(q∗ − q)
q(q∗ − q′)
(
v(q′)− v(q∗)) ≥ q′(q∗ − q)
q∗(q∗ − q′)
(
v(q′)− v(q∗)) ,
where the last inequality is due to q ≤ q∗. Hence, we have
R(q∗)−R(q′) =
∫ q∗
q′
R′(q)dq =
∫ q∗
q′
φ(v(q))dq ≥
∫ q∗
q′
q′(q∗ − q)
q∗(q∗ − q′)
(
v(q′)− v(q∗))dq
=
q′
2q∗
(q∗ − q′)(v(q′)− v(q∗)). (4)
On the other hand, we have
R(q∗)−R(q′) = q∗v(q∗)− q′v(q′). (5)
Taking the linear combination 2q
∗
3q∗−q′ · (4) + q
∗−q′
3q∗−q′ · (5), we have
R(q∗)−R(q′) ≥ (q
∗ − q′)2
3q∗ − q′ v(q
∗) =
1
q∗(3q∗ − q′)(q
∗ − q′)2R(q∗) ≥ 1
3
(q∗ − q′)2R(q∗) ,
where the last inequality holds because 0 ≤ q∗, q′ ≤ 1.
Next we show how to use the lemma (and additional ideas) to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We first show that for any two samples v1 and v2 with quantiles q1, q2 such
that either q1 < q2 < q
∗ or q∗ < q1 < q2, if the revenue of one of them is at least (1 − 2) times
smaller than that of the other, e.g., q1 < q2 < q
∗ and v1q1 < (1 − )v2q2, then with probability at
least 1 − o( 1
m2
) the algorithm would choose v2 over v1. Further, with high probability, there is at
least one sample that is 2 -close to q
∗ in quantile space both among samples with quantile at least
q∗ and among those with quantile at most q∗. By concavity of the revenue curve, such samples are
(1− 2)-optimal. So the theorem follows from union bound.
Let us focus on the case when q1 < q2 < q
∗ and v1q1 < (1 − )v2q2 as the other case is almost
identical. Suppose R(q1) = (1 −∆)R(q2) and q1 = q2 − δ. By concavity of the revenue curve and
Lemma 3.2, we have
R(q2)−R(q1) ≥ R(q∗)−R(q∗ − q2 + q1) ≥ 1
4
(q2 − q1)2R(q∗) ≥ 1
4
(q2 − q1)2R(q2).
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So we have ∆ = Ω(δ2).
Let q˜im be the number of samples with value at least vi, i = 1, 2. The goal is to show that
q˜1v1 < q˜2v2 with probability at least 1− o( 1m2 ).
Note that the straightforward argument does not work because that we would need Ω˜(−2)
samples to estimate qi up to a (1− ) factor. Before diving into the technical proof, let us explain
informally how to get away with fewer samples. A bad scenario for the straightforward argument
is when, say, q˜1 > (1 + ∆)q1 and q˜2 < (1 − ∆)q2. We observe that such a bad scenario is very
unlikely due to correlation between q˜1 and q˜2: the samples used to estimate q1 and q2 are the same;
those that cause the algorithm to overestimate q1 also contribute to the estimation of q2; for the
bad scenario to happen, it must be that the number of samples q1 and q2 is much smaller than its
expectation (as we will formulate as (6)), whose probability is tiny.
Now we proceed with the formal proof. Since we consider the 1e -guarded empirical reserve,
q1, q2 ≥ 1e . By the Chernoff bound, with Θ(−3/2 log −1) samples, we have q˜i ≥ (1− 3/4)qi = Ω(1)
and q˜i ≤ (1 + 3/4)qi with high probability.
If q˜1v1 ≥ q˜2v2, then
q˜1
q˜2
≥ v2
v1
=
R(q2)
R(q1)
q1
q2
= (1−∆)−1 q1
q2
=
q1
q2
+ Ω(∆) .
So
q˜2 − q˜1 =
(
1− q˜1
q˜2
)
q˜2 ≤
(
1− q˜1
q˜2
)
(1 + 3/4)q2
≤
(
1− q1
q2
− Ω(∆)
)
(1 + 3/4)q2 = q2 − q1 + δ3/4 − Ω(∆).
Since δ = O(
√
∆) and ∆ ≥ 2 , we have δ3/4 = o(∆). So
q˜2 − q˜1 ≤ q2 − q1 − Ω(∆) . (6)
That is, the number of samples that fall between q1 and q2 is smaller than its expectation by at least
Ω(∆m). By the Chernoff bound, the probability of this event is at most exp
(− ∆2mδ ). Recall that
∆ = Ω(δ2), ∆ ≥ 2 , and m = Θ(−3/2 log −1). So this probability is at most exp(−Ω(log −1)) =
o( 1
m2
) with an appropriate choice of parameters.
3.2 α-Strongly Regular Upper Bound
Our proof of Theorem 3.1 can be extended to α-strongly regular distributions with α > 0. We
present the formal statement and sketch the necessary changes below.
Theorem 3.3. The empirical reserve with m = Θ(−3/2 log −1) samples is (1− )-approximate for
all α-strongly regular distributions, for a constant α > 0.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on two properties: the monopoly price having at least constant
sale probability (Lemma 2.1), and strict concavity of the revenue curve at the monopoly quantile
(Lemma 3.2). The proof of Theorem 3.3 is identical, modulo using weaker versions of the lemmas.
Specifically, we will replace Lemma 2.1 by Lemma 2.2, and Lemma 3.2 by the following lemma,
whose proof is almost identical to that of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. For any q′ 6= q∗, R(q∗)−R(q′) ≥ α3 (q∗ − q′)2R(q∗).
In the Appendix we use Lemma 3.4 to prove Theorem 3.3.
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3.3 General Upper Bounds
Next, we present a sample complexity upper bound for general distributions using R∗δ as a bench-
mark. Recall that R∗δ is the optimal revenue by prices with sale probability at least δ.
Theorem 3.5. The δ2 -guarded empirical reserve with m = Θ(δ
−1−2 log(δ−1−1)) gives revenue at
least (1− )R∗δ for all distributions.
Proof Sketch. The proof is standard so we present only a sketch here. Let q∗δ = arg maxq≥δ qv(q)
be the optimal reserve price with sale probability at least δ. With high probability, there exists
at least one sampled price with quantile between (1− 3)q∗ and q∗: this price has revenue at least
(1 − 3)R∗δ . Further, since q∗ ≥ δ, this price has rank at least δ2 (among sampled prices) with
high probability and thus is considered by the empirical reserve algorithm. Finally, with high
probability, any sampled price with rank at least δ2 has sale probability at least
δ
4 ; for prices with
sale probability at least δ4 , the algorithm estimates their sale probability up to a 1− 3 factor with
high probability with m = Θ(δ−1−2 log(δ−1−1)) samples. The theorem then follows.
We remark that one can also derive a bound for a single sample (i.e., m = 1) which guarantees
expected revenue at least (δ/2)R∗δ .
Note that for distributions with support [1, H], the optimal sale probability is at least 1/H.
So we have the following theorem as a direct corollary of Theorem 3.5. This bound can also be
deduced from [4]; we include it for completeness.
Theorem 3.6. The empirical reserve with m = Θ(H−2 log(H−1)) samples is (1−)-approximate
for all distributions with support [1, H].
4 Asymptotic Lower Bounds
This section gives asymptotically tight (up to a log factor) sample complexity lower bounds. These
lower bounds are information-theoretic and apply to all possible pricing strategies, including ran-
domized strategies. We first present a general framework for proving sample complexity lower
bounds, and then instatiate it for each of the classes of distributions listed in Table 1.
4.1 Lower Bound Framework: Reducing Pricing to Classification
The high-level plan is to reduce the pricing problem to a classification problem. We will construct
two distributions D1 and D2 and show that given any pricing algorithm that is (1− )-approximate
for both D1 and D2, we can construct a classification algorithm that can distinguish D1 and D2 with
constant probability, say, 13 , using the same number of samples as the pricing algorithm. Further,
we will construct D1 and D2 to be similar enough and use tools from information theory to show
a lower bound on the number of samples needed to distinguish the two distributions.
Information Theory Preliminaries Consider two distributions P1 and P2 over a sample space Ω.
Let p1 and p2 be the density functions. The statistical distance between P1 and P2 is:
δ(P1, P2) =
1
2
∫
Ω
∣∣p1(ω)− p2(ω)∣∣dω.
In information theory, it is known (e.g., Baigneres et al. [3]) that no classification algorithm
A : Ω→ {1, 2} can distinguish P1 and P2 correctly with probability strictly better than δ(P1,P2)+12 ,
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i.e., there exists i ∈ {1, 2}, Prω∼Pi
[
A(ω) = i
] ≤ δ(P1,P2)+12 . This lower bound applies to arbitrary
randomized classification algorithms.
Suppose we want to show a sample complexity lower bound of m. Then we will let Pi = D
m
i and
upper bound δ(P1, P2). However, the statistical distance is hard to bound directly when we have
multiple samples: δ(Dm1 , D
m
2 ) cannot be written as function of m and δ(D1, D2). In particular, the
statistical distance does not grow linearly with the number of samples.
In order to derive an upper bound on the statistical distance with multiple samples, it is many
times convenient to use the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, which is defined as follows:
DKL(P1‖P2) = Eω∼P1
[
ln
p1(ω)
p2(ω)
]
.
In information theory, the KL divergence can be viewed as the redundancy in the encoding in the
case that the true distribution is P1 and we use the optimal encoding for distribution P2. One nice
property of the KL divergence is that it is additive over samples: if P1 = D
m
1 and P2 = D
m
2 are
the distributions over m samples of D1 and D2, then the KL divergence of P1 and P2 is m times
DKL(D1‖D2).
We can relate the KL divergence to the statistical distance through Pinsker’s inequality [20],
which states that:
δ(P1, P2) ≤
√
1
2DKL(P1‖P2)
By symmetry, we also have δ(P1, P2) ≤
√
1
2DKL(P2‖P1), so
δ(P1, P2) ≤ 1
2
√
DKL(P1‖P2) +DKL(P2‖P1).
This implies that we can upper bound the statistical distance of m samples from D1 and D2
by 12
√
m · (DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1)). To get statistical distance at least, say, 13 , we need
m = 49
1
DKL(D1‖D2)+DKL(D2‖D1) samples.
Reducing Pricing to Classification Next, we present the reduction from pricing to classifica-
tion. Given a value distribution D and α < 1, its α-optimal price set is defined to be the set of
reserve prices that induce at least α fraction of the optimal revenue.
Lemma 4.1. If value distributions D1 and D2 have disjoint (1 − 3)-approximate price sets, and
there is a pricing algorithm that is (1 − )-approximate for both D1 and D2, then there is an
classification algorithm that distinguish P1 and P2 correctly with probability at least
2
3 , using the
same number of samples as the pricing algorithm.
We omit the straightforward proof. Note that to distinguish P1 and P2 correctly with probability
at least 23 , the statistical distance between P1 and P2 is least
1
3 . So we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. If value distributions D1 and D2 have disjoint (1− 3)-approximate price sets, and
there is a pricing algorithm that is (1− )-approximate for both D1 and D2, then the algorithm uses
at least 49
1
DKL(D1‖D2)+DKL(D2‖D1) samples.
A Tool for Constructing Distributions with Small KL Divergence Given Theorem 4.2,
our goal is to construct a pair of distributions with small relative entropy subject to having disjoint
approximately optimal price sets. Here we introduce a lemma from the differential privacy literature
that is useful for constructing pairs of distributions with small KL divergence.
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Lemma 4.3 (Lemma III.2 of Dwork et al. [12]). If distributions D1 and D2 with densities f1 and
f2 satisfy that (1 + )
−1 ≤ f1(ω)f2(ω) ≤ (1 + ) for every ω ∈ Ω, then
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) ≤ 2 .
For completeness, we include the proof in the Appendix.
The following two useful variants have similar proofs.
Lemma 4.4. If distributions D1 and D2 satisfy the condition in Lemma 4.3, and further there is
a subset of outcomes Ω′ such that p1(ω) = p2(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω′, then
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) ≤ 2
(
1− p1(Ω′)
)
.
Lemma 4.5. If distributions D1 and D2 satisfy that (1 + )
−1 ≤ f1(ω)f2(ω) ≤ (1 + ) for every ω ∈ Ω
and (1 + ′)−1 ≤ f1(ω)f2(ω) ≤ (1 + ′) for any ω ∈ Ω′ ⊆ Ω, then
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) ≤ 2p1(Ω \ Ω′) + (′)2p1(Ω′) .
4.2 Applications
Inspired by the above lemmas, we will aim to construct D1 and D2 such that the densities of all
values are close in the two distributions.
General Lower Bound As a warm-up case, we demonstrate how to use the above framework
to derive a tight (up to a log factor) sample complexity lower bound for general distributions using
R∗δ as benchmark. Recall that R
∗
δ is the optimal revenue by prices with sale probability at least δ.
Theorem 4.6. Every pricing algorithm that guarantees at least (1− )R∗δ revenue for all distribu-
tions uses at least Ω(δ−1−2) samples.
Proof. Let D1 and D2 be two distributions with support {H = δ−1, 2, 1}: D1 takes value H with
probability 1+3H , 2 with probability
1−3
H , and 1 with probability 1 − 2H ; D2 takes value H with
probability 1−3H , 2 with probability
1+3
H , and 1 with probability 1− 2H . Clearly, D1 and D2 have
disjoint (1− 3)-approximate price sets. Further,
DKL(D1‖D2) = DKL(D2‖D1) = 1+3H ln 1+31−3 + 1−3H ln 1−31+3 = 6H ln 1+31−3 = O( 
2
H ) .
So the claim follows from Theorem 4.2.
The way we prove Theorem 4.6 also implies a tight (up to a log factor) sample complexity lower
bound for distributions with support in [1, H].
Theorem 4.7. Any pricing algorithm that is (1− )-approximate for all distributions with support
[1, H] uses at least Ω(H−2) samples.
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11− 20
(1− 20)2
0 0 20
1− 30 + 220
30 − 220 1 q
R(q)
Figure 1: D1 is the distribution with revenue curve R1 that goes from (0, 1) to (1, 0). D2 is
identical to D1 for quantiles from 20 to 1; for quantiles from 0 to 20, D2’s revenue curve goes
from (0, (1− 20)2) to (20, 1− 20).
Regular Lower Bound We now show that (1− )-approximate pricing for regular distributions
requires Ω(−3) samples.
Theorem 4.8. Any pricing algorithm that is (1− )-approximate for all regular distributions uses
at least (1−6)
2
4863
= Ω( 1
3
) samples.
This result implies, for example, we need at least 12 samples to guarantee 95 percent of the
optimal revenue, and at least 1935 samples to guarantee 99 percent.
We next describe the two distributions that we use and explain the lower bound for regular
distributions.Let D1 be the distribution with c.d.f. F1(v) = 1− 1v+1 and p.d.f. f1(v) = 1(v+1)2 . Let
0 = 3 and let D2 be the distribution with c.d.f.
F2(v) =
 1−
1
v+1 if 0 ≤ v ≤ 1−2020
1− (1−20)2v−(1−20) if v >
1−20
20
and p.d.f.
f2(v) =

1
(v+1)2
if 0 ≤ v ≤ 1−2020
(1−20)2
(v−(1−20))2 if v >
1−20
20
.
We have
f1
f2
=

1 if 0 ≤ v ≤ 1− 20
20
1
(1− 20)2
(v − (1− 20))2
(v + 1)2
∈ [(1− 20)2, (1− 20)−2] if v > 1− 20
20
.
(7)
The revenue curves of D1 and D2 are summarized in Figure 1.
Lemma 4.9.
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) ≤ 8
3
0
(1− 20)2 .
12
R(q)
q10 1−√0
Figure 2: R1 (the lower solid curve) is a quadratic curve that peaks at q = 1, R1 = 1, and passes
through q = 0, R1 = 0. To construct R2, first draw the revenue curves of the uniform distributions
over
[
1 + 201−√0+20 , 2
]
(the dashed curve) and
[
1, 1 + 11−2√0
]
(the dash-dotted curve). R2 (the
bold solid curve) is the lower envelope of the two curves.
Proof. By (7), we have (1 − 20) ≤ f1f2 ≤ (1 − 20)−1. Further, note that a 1 − 2 fraction (w.r.t.
quantile) of D1 and D2 are identical. The lemma follows from Lemma 4.4.
Let R1 and R2 be the revenue curves of D1 and D2. Let R
∗
1 and R
∗
2 be the corresponding
optimal revenues. The following lemmas follow directly from the definition of D1 and D2.
Lemma 4.10. R1(v) ≥ (1− 0)R∗1 if and only if v ≥ 10 − 1.
Lemma 4.11. R2(v) ≥ (1− 0)R∗1 if and only if 10 − 3 + 20 ≥ v ≥ 120−20 − 1.
Recall that 0 = 3. The (1 − 3)-optimal price sets of D1 and D2 are disjoint. Theorem 4.8
follows from Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.9.
MHR Lower Bound We now turn to MHR distributions and show that (1 − )-approximate
pricing for MHR distributions requires Ω(−3/2) samples.
Theorem 4.12. Any pricing algorithm that is (1− )-approximate for all MHR distributions uses
at least Ω(−3/2) samples.
We again describe the two distributions used and defer the full proof to the Appendix. Let D1
be the uniform distribution over [1, 2]. Let 0 = c where c is a sufficiently large constant to be
determined later. Define D2 by scaling up the density (of D1) in v ∈ [1 + √0, 2] by a factor of
1 + 201−√0 and scaling down the density in v ∈ [1, 1 +
√
0] by a factor 1− 2√0, i.e.,
f2(v) =
{
1− 2√0 if 1 ≤ v ≤ 1 +√0
1 + 201−√0 if 1 +
√
0 < v ≤ 2.
We summarize the revenue curves of D1 and D2 in Figure 2.
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5 Single Sample Regime: Beating Identity Pricing for MHR Dis-
tributions
This section considers deterministic 1-sample pricing strategies. Recall from the Introduction that
“identity pricing,” meaning p(vi) = v1, has an approximation guarantee of
1
2 for the class of
regular distributions. We show in the appendix that there is no better 1-sample deterministic
pricing strategy for the class of regular distributions, and that identity pricing is no better than
1
2 -approximate even for the special case of MHR distributions.
Our next goal is to show that scaling down the sampled value, i.e., p(v) = cv for some constant
c < 1, achieves an approximation ratio better than 12 for MHR distributions.
Theorem 5.1. p(v) = 0.85v is 0.589-approximate for MHR distributions.
The intuition is as follows. We divide the quantile space into two subsets: those that are larger
than the quantile of the optimal reserve, i.e., q∗, and those that are smaller.
• First, consider those that are larger. We recall the argument that identity pricing is 12 -
approximate: the expected revenue of identity pricing is the area under the revenue curve;
by concavity of the revenue curve, this is at least half the height and, thus, half the optimal
revenue. We show that the revenue curve of an MHR distribution is at least as concave as
that of an exponential distribution (Lemma C.2). This implies that identity pricing is strictly
better than 12 -approximate for quantiles larger than q
∗. Furthermore, scaling down the price
by a factor of c decreases the revenue by at most a factor of c. For c < 1 close enough to 1,
the expected revenue of this part is still strictly better than one half of the optimal.
• Next, consider quantiles that are smaller than q∗. Theorem C.1 suggests that an approximate
point mass is a worst-case scenario, where the sale probability of identity pricing is only 12
on average. By scaling down the sampled value by a little, we double the selling probability
w.r.t. a point mass without changing the price by much. So the expected revenue of this part
is also strictly better than one half of optimal.
In the Appendix, we present the formal argument.
6 Single Sample Negative Results
First, we note that identify pricing is an optimal deterministic strategy for regular distributions
(see Appendix for all proofs).
Theorem 6.1. No deterministic 1-pricing strategy is better than a 12 -approximation for regular
distributions.
Next, we turn to MHR distributions. We first present a negative result that holds for every
continuously differentiable pricing. Then, we present a slightly weaker negative result that holds
for all deterministic 1-pricing algorithms.
Theorem 6.2. No continuously differentiable 1-pricing strategy is better than a 0.677-approximate
for MHR distributions.
We consider exponential distributions and truncated exponential distributions, i.e., truncate
the all values that are higher than some threshold v∗ in an exponential distribution and replace
it with a uniform distribution over [v∗, v∗ + α], where v∗ and α are parameters to be determined
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later. We will show that no continuously differentiable pricing functions can achieve better than
0.677-approximation in both cases. We consider these two distributions because of the intuition
from the MHR upper bound analysis: the algorithm need to scale down the sampled value to handle
point mass distributions, but it should not scale down the value by too much, so that it still gest
good revenue for, e.g., the exponential distribution. The truncation is an approximation to a point
mass and forces the algorithm to scale down.
Theorem 6.3. No deterministic 1-pricing strategy is better than a e4 ≈ 0.68-approximate for MHR
distributions.
To prove this more general negative result, we consider a distribution of exponential distribu-
tions, i.e., we first draw a parameter λ from a distribution and then draw the sample v from an
exponential distribution with parameter λ. We next solve for the best response pricing strategy
w.r.t. this distribution of instances, which is the identity pricing. The theorem then follows from
the approximation ratio of identity pricing for exponential distributions.
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A Missing Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We use the same setup and notation as in the MHR case. Using the weaker
lemmas, we have qi, q˜i = Ω(α
1/(1−α)), and ∆ ≥ Ω(αδ2).
If q˜1v1 ≥ q˜2v2, then
q˜1
q˜2
≥ v2
v1
=
R(q2)
R(q1)
q1
q2
= (1−∆)−1 q1
q2
=
q1
q2
+ Ω(α1/(1−α)∆) .
So
q˜2 − q˜1 =
(
1− q˜1
q˜2
)
q˜2 ≤
(
1− q˜1
q˜2
)
(1 + 3/4)q2
≤
(
1− q1
q2
− Ω(α1/(1−α)∆)
)
(1 + 3/4)q2 = q2 − q1 + δ3/4 − Ω(α1/(1−α)∆).
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Since δ = O(
√
∆/α) and ∆ ≥ 2 , we have δ3/4 = o(∆). So
q˜2 − q˜1 ≤ q2 − q1 − Ω(α1/(1−α)∆) . (8)
That is, the number of samples that fall between q1 and q2 differs from its expectation by at least
Ω(α1/(1−α)∆m). By Chernoff bound, the probability of this event is at most exp
(− (α1/(1−α)∆)2mδ ).
Recall that ∆ = Ω(αδ2), ∆ ≥ 2 , and m = Θ(α−2/(1−α)−1/2−3/2 log −1). So this probability is at
most exp(−Ω(log −1)) = o( 1
m2
) with a suitable choice of parameters.
B Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.3. By the definition of KL divergence, we have
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) =
∫
Ω
[
p1(ω) ln
p1(ω)
p2(ω)
+ p2(ω) ln
p2(ω)
p1(ω)
]
dω
=
∫
Ω
[
p1(ω)
(
ln
p1(ω)
p2(ω)
+ ln
p2(ω)
p1(ω)
)
+
(
p2(ω)− p1(ω)
)
ln
p2(ω)
p1(ω)
]
dω
≤
∫
Ω
[
0 + |p2(ω)− p1(ω)| ln(1 + )
]
dω.
The last inequality follows by (1 + )−1 ≤ f1(ω)f2(ω) ≤ (1 + ). Further, this condition also implies that
|p2(ω)− p1(ω)| ≤
(
(1 + )− 1)min{p1(ω), p2(ω)} = min{p1(ω), p2(ω)} .
Thus, we have
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) ≤  ln(1 + )
∫
Ω
min{p1(ω), p2(ω)}dω ≤  ln(1 + ) ≤ 2 .
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.12
Recall that the revenue curves of D1 and D2 are summarized in Figure 2.
Lemma B.1.
DKL(D1‖D2) +DKL(D2‖D1) = O(3/20 ) .
Proof. By our choice of D1 and D2, D1 and D2 differs by 1 +
20
1−√0 for v ∈ [1 +
√
0, 2], and differs
by 1− 2√0 for v ∈ [1, 1 +√0]. The lemma follows from Lemma 4.5.
Let q∗i be the revenue optimal quantile of Ri, and let R
∗
i = Ri(q
∗
i ) be the optimal revenue.
Lemma B.2. q∗1 = 1, and R∗1 = 1.
Proof. R1(q) = q(2− q) is a quadratic curve that peaks at q = 1 with R1(1) = 1.
Lemma B.3. q∗2 = 1−
√
0 + 20, and R
∗
2 = 1 + 0 + 2
3/2.
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Proof. For 1 ≤ v ≤ 1 + √0 and 1 − √0 + 20 ≤ q(v) ≤ 1, R2 is identical to the revenue curve
of the uniform distribution over [1, 1 + 11−2√0 ], i.e., q
(2−2√0
1−2√0 − 11−2√0 q
)
, which is maximized at
q = 1−√0.
For 1 +
√
0 ≤ v ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ q(v) ≤ 1−√0 + 20, R2 is identical to the revenue curve of the
uniform distribution over
[
1 + 201−√0+20 , 2
]
, i.e., q
(
2 − 1−
√
0
1−√0+20 q
)
, which is maximized at q = 1
in interval [0, 1].
R2 is maximized at the intersection of the two parts, where q = 1−√0 +20, and R2(1−√0 +
20) = 1 + 0 + 2
3/2.
The following lemmas follow from our construction of D1 and D2.
Lemma B.4. If R1(q) ≥ (1− 3)R∗1, then q ≥ 1−
√
3 and v(q) ≤ 1−3
1−√3R
∗
1.
Lemma B.5. If R2(q) ≥ (1− 3)R∗2, then q ≤ 1−
√
0 + 20 +
√
3 and v(q) ≥ 1−3
1−√0+20+
√
3
R∗2.
Therefore, when 0 = c for sufficiently large constant c, we have 1−
√
3 > 1−√0 +20 +
√
3.
Further note thatR∗2 > R∗1, so the (1−3)-optimal price sets ofD1 andD2 are disjoint. Theorem 4.12
then follows from Theorem 4.2 and Lemma B.1.
C Missing Proofs from Section 5
C.1 Lower Bound for Identity Pricing
Since MHR distributions are more restrictive than regular ones, one might expect identity pricing
to give better than 12 -approximation for then. This is not the case.
Theorem C.1. The identity pricing algorithm is no better than 12 -approximation for MHR distri-
butions.
Proof. Consider the uniform distribution over [1 − , 1]. The optimal revenue is 1 − , with re-
serve price 1 − . The identity pricing algorithm gets revenue 1
2
∫ 1
1− v(1 − v)dv = 12 − 13. The
approximation ratio approaches 12 as  goes to zero.
We remark that the lower bound still holds if the support must start from 0 because we can add
a little mass on [0, 1− ] without changing the nature of the lower bound. The same trick applies
to the lower bounds in Section 6.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let Rˆ(q) be the expected revenue of reserve price p(v(q))) = cv(q) w.r.t. revenue curve R. Define
Rˆexp(q) similarly w.r.t. the exponential distribution Dexp. For ease of presentation, we will w.l.o.g.
scale the values so that v(q∗) = vexp(q∗) and, thus, R(q∗) = Rexp(q∗).
Technical Lemmas about MHR Distributions
Given the revenue at quantile q∗, Rexp minimizes the revenue at any quantile larger than q∗ among
all MHR distributions.
Lemma C.2. For any 1 ≥ q ≥ q∗, then R(q) ≥ Rexp(q).
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Proof. Suppose not. Let q0 be a quantile such that R(q0) < R
exp(q0). Since R(q
∗) = Rexp(q∗)
and that R and Rexp are continuous, there exists q1 ∈ [q∗, q0] such that R(q1) = Rexp(q1) and
R′(q1) ≤ (Rexp)′(q1). Similarly, since R(1) ≥ 0 = Rexp(1), there exists q2 ∈ [q0, 1] such that
R(q2) < R
exp(q2) and R
′(q2) > (Rexp)′(q2).
Recall that R′(q1) = φ(v(q1)) and R′(q2) = φ(v(q2)). By the MHR assumption,
R′(q1)−R′(q2) = φ(v(q1))− φ(v(q2)) ≥ v(q1)− v(q2) = R(q1)
q1
− R(q2)
q2
. (9)
By the definition of Rexp, the above relation holds with equality for Rexp:
(Rexp)′(q1)− (Rexp)′(q2) = R
exp(q1)
q1
− R
exp(q2)
q2
(10)
By (9) minus (10) and that R(q1) = R
exp(q1), we have
R′(q1)−R′(q2)− (Rexp)′(q1) + (Rexp)′(q2) ≥ R
exp(q2)
q2
− R(q2)
q2
> 0 ,
contradicting R′(q1) ≤ (Rexp)′(q1) and R′(q2) > (Rexp)′(q2).
The above lemma does not apply to quantiles smaller than q∗. Consider a point mass, or a
uniform distribution over [1− , 1] for sufficiently small  for a counter example. The problem with
applying it to quantiles smaller than q∗ is that q1 might be 0. So we have zero divided by zero issue
in (9) and (10) and, thus, R(q1)/q1 may not equal R
exp(q1)/q1 when we subtract (10) from (9).
As a corollary of Lemma C.2, Rexp minimizes the value at each quantile larger than q∗ (Lemma C.3),
and it maximizes the quantile at each value smaller than v(q∗) (Lemma C.4).
Lemma C.3. For any 1 ≥ q ≥ q∗, then v(q) ≥ vexp(q).
Lemma C.4. For any 0 ≤ v ≤ v(q∗), then q(v) ≥ qexp(v).
Expected Revenue of Large Quantiles
We show that for quantiles between q∗ and 1, Rexp is indeed the worst-case scenario.
Lemma C.5. For any 1 ≥ q ≥ q∗, Rˆ(q) ≥ Rˆexp(q).
Proof. We abuse notation and let R(v) = R(q(v)). By Lemma C.3, v(q) ≥ vexp(q). So we have
cv(q) ≥ cvexp(q). Since R(v) is non-decreasing when v > v(q∗) and v(q∗) > cv(q) ≥ cvexp(q), we
have Rˆ(q) = R
(
cv(q)
) ≥ R(cvexp(q)).
Further, by Lemma C.4, Rexp minimizes the sale probability at any price v ≤ v(q∗) and, thus,
minimizes the revenue at price v. So we have R
(
cvexp(q)
) ≥ Rexp(cvexp(q)) = Rˆexp(q) and the
lemma follows.
As direct corollary of Lemma C.5, we can lower bound the expected revenue of quantiles between
q∗ and 1 by the expected revenue of the worst-case distribution Rexp.
Lemma C.6.
∫ 1
q∗ Rˆ(q)dq ≥
∫ 1
q∗ Rˆ
exp(q)dq.
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Expected Revenue of Small Quantiles
Next, we consider quantiles between 0 and q∗. Let q0 be that cv(q0) = v(q∗), i.e., the reserve price
is smaller than v(q∗) if and only if the sample has quantile larger than q0. We will first lower bound
the expected revenue of quantiles smaller than q0, and then handle the other quantiles.
Lemma C.7. For any 0 ≤ q′ ≤ q0,
∫ q′
0 Rˆ(q)dq ≥ 1+
√
1−c
2 q
′R(q′).
Proof. Let c0 =
c
2 . For any i ≥ 0, let ci+1 = 1 − c4ci . We will inductively show that
∫ q′
0 Rˆ(q)dq ≥
ciq
′R(q′), and then prove that ci converges to 1+
√
1−c
2 .
Base Case By concavity of the revenue curve,
∫ q′
0 R(q)dq ≥ 12R(q′). Further, lower reserve prices
has larger sale probability. So Rˆ(q) ≥ cR(q) and the base case follows.
Inductive Step Let q1 be that cv(q1) = v(q
′), i.e., the reserve price is smaller than v(q′) iff the
sample has quantile larger than q1. We have
R(q1) = v(q1)q1 =
v(q′)q1
c
=
q1
cq′
q′v(q′) =
q1
cq′
R(q′).
For the interval from 0 to q1, by inductive hypothesis we have∫ q1
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥ ciq1R(q1) = ciq
2
1
cq′
R(q′)
Next, consider the interval from q1 to q
′. For any q1 ≤ q ≤ q′, by that q′ ≤ q0 and our choice of q0,
we have v(q∗) < cv(q) < cv(q1) = v(q′). So Rˆ(q) ≥ R(q′). Thus,∫ q′
q1
Rˆ(q)dq ≥ (q′ − q1)R(q′).
Putting together, we have∫ q′
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥
(
ci
c
(
q1
q′
)2
+
(
1− q1
q′
))
q′R(q′).
Minimizing the RHS over 0 ≤ q1 ≤ q′, we have∫ q′
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥
(
1− c
4ci
)
q′R(q′) = ci+1q′R(q′).
Convergence of ci There is only one stable stationary point,
1+
√
1−c
2 , for the recursion ci+1 =
1− c4ci . The other, non-stable, stationary point is
1−√1−c
2 . Note that for any 0 < c < 1, c0 =
c
2 >
1−√1−c
2 . So ci converges to
1+
√
1−c
2 as i goes to infinity.
Lemma C.8. If c = 0.85, then
∫ q∗
0 Rˆ(q)dq ≥ 0.656q∗R(q∗).
20
Proof. Recall that cv(q0) = v(q
∗). So
R(q0) = q0v(q0) =
q0
cq∗
q∗v(q∗) =
q0
cq∗
R(q∗).
Plugging c = 0.85 and 1+
√
1−c
2 ≥ 0.693 into Lemma C.7, we have∫ q0
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥ 0.693q0R(q0) = 0.6931
c
(
q0
q∗
)2
q∗R(q∗) ≥ 0.815
(
q0
q∗
)2
q∗R(q∗). (11)
On the other hand, for every q0 ≤ q ≤ q∗, by concavity of the revenue curve, we have
qv(q) ≥ q − q0
q∗ − q0 q
∗v(q∗) +
q∗ − q
q∗ − q0 q0v(q0).
Thus,
v(q) ≥ q
∗v(q∗)− q0v(q0)
q∗ − q0 +
1
q
q0q
∗
q∗ − q0
(
v(q0)− v(q∗)
)
.
Further, by our choice of q0, the quantile of cv(q) is at least q
∗. So we have
Rˆ(q) ≥ cv(q)q∗ ≥
(
q∗v(q∗)− q0v(q0)
q∗ − q0 +
1
q
q0q
∗
q∗ − q0
(
v(q0)− v(q∗)
))
cq∗.
Let x = q0q∗ . Plugging in cv(q0) = v(q
∗), R(q0) = q0cq∗R(q
∗), and c = 0.85, we have(
0.85− x
q∗ − q0 +
1
q
(1− 0.85)x
1− x
)
q∗R(q∗).
Integrating over q from q0 to q
∗, we have∫ q∗
q0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥
(
(0.85− x) + ln
(
1
x
)
0.15x
1− x
)
q∗R(q∗). (12)
Summing up (11) and (12) gives∫ q∗
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥
(
(0.85− x) + ln
(
1
x
)
0.15x
1− x + 0.815x
2
)
q∗R(q∗).
We would like to minimize f(x) for x ∈ [0, 1], where
f(x) = (0.85− x) + ln
(
1
x
)
0.15x
1− x + 0.815x
2.
Taking the derivative we have
f ′(x) = −1− 0.15
1− x −
0.15 ln(x)
(1− x)2 + 1.63x.
This function has two roots in x ∈ [0, 1], at x ∈ [0.546, 0.547] (f ′(0.546) < −3∗10−5 and f ′(0.547) >
10−3) and at x ∈ [4.7 · 10−4, 4.8 · 10−4] (f ′(4.7 · 10−4) > 1.3 · 10−3 and f ′(4.8 · 10−4) < 1.9 · 10−3).
Testing the second derivative
f ′′(x) = − 0.15
(1− x)2 −
0.3 ln(x)
(1− x)3 −
0.15
x(1− x)2 + 1.63
we have that x ≈ 0.546 is a minimum point (f ′′(0.546) ≈ 1.5) and x ≈ 4.7∗10−4 is a local maximum
(f ′′(4.7 ∗ 10−4) ≈ −315). Therefore, the only remaining point we need to test is x = 0 (the end of
the interval [0, 1]) and we have limx→0 f(x) = 0.85.
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Proof of Theorem 5.1
Plugging in the exponential distribution in Lemma C.6, we obtain∫ 1
q∗
Rˆ(q)dq ≥ c
(c+ 1)2
1− (q∗)c+1 + (q∗)c+1 ln(q∗)c+1
−(q∗) ln(q∗) R(q
∗).
Combining this with Lemma C.8 yields∫ 1
0
Rˆ(q)dq ≥
(
0.656q∗ +
c
(c+ 1)2
1− (q∗)c+1 + (q∗)c+1 ln(q∗)c+1
−(q∗) ln(q∗)
)
R(q∗).
We would like to lower bound f(x), where
f(x) = 0.656x+
c
(c+ 1)2
(
− x−1 ln−1(x) + xc ln−1(x)− (c+ 1)xc
)
.
The derivative is
f ′(x) = 0.656 +
c
(c+ 1)2
(
x−2 ln−1(x) + x−2 ln−2(x) + cxc−1 ln−1(x)− xc−1 ln−2(x)− c(c+ 1)xc
)
.
For c = 0.85, we have a root at some x ∈ [0.544, 0.545] as f ′(0.544) < −1.7 · 10−4 and f ′(0.545) >
9 ·10−4. By testing the second derivative, this is a local minimum and the only root in the interval.
The minimal value is at least 0.589 and the lemma follows.
D Missing Proofs in 6
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Distributions with triangle revenue curves (with vertices (0, 0), (1, 0), and
(q∗, R(q∗))) are commonly considered to be the worst-case regular distributions because they have
the least concave revenue curves. In particular, we consider two such distributions: a point mass at
v, whose revenue curve is a triangle with (q∗, R(q∗)) = (1, v), and the distribution F (v) = 1− 1v+1 ,
whose revenue curve is a triangle with (q∗, R(q∗)) = (0, 1).
To achieve a non-trivial approximation ratio when the distribution is a point mass at v, p(v) ≤ v
must hold. Then, consider the second distribution. The revenue at price v is vv+1 , which is strictly
increasing in v. So every deterministic pricing algorithm that satisfies p(v) ≤ v gets revenue less
than or equal to that of the identity pricing algorithm p(v) = v, which is 2-approximate for the
second distribution.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let us first assume the pricing algorithm is linear, i.e., b(v) = cv. As in the
proof of Theorem 6.1, the algorithm has a finite approximation ratio only if c ≤ 1.
We consider exponential distributions and truncated exponential distributions, i.e., truncate
the all values that are higher than some threshold v∗ in an exponential distribution and replace it
with a uniform distribution over [v∗, v∗+α], where v∗ and α are parameters to be determined later.
We show that no scaling parameter c can achieve better than 0.67-approximation in both cases.
We consider these two distributions because of the intuition from the MHR upper bound anal-
ysis: the algorithm needs to scale down the sampled value to handle point mass case, but it should
not scale down the value by too much in order to get good revenue for, e.g., the exponential dis-
tribution. The truncation is an approximation to a point mass and forces the algorithm to scale
down.
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Exponential Distribution Consider the approximation ratio w.r.t. the exponential distribution
Dexp. Given a sample with quantile q, its value is vexp(q) = − ln q. So b(v(q)) = −c ln q = − ln qc
and the sale probability is qc. The expected revenue of b(v) is∫ 1
0
−qc ln qcdq = c
(c+ 1)2
.
Recall that Rexp(q) = −q ln q, which is maximized at q = 1e with optimal revenue 1e . So the
approximation ratio w.r.t. Dexp is ec
(c+1)2
. Note that this immediately gives a lower bound of
e
4 ≈ 0.68. If c ≤ 0.878, then ec(c+1)2 < 0.677. For now on, we assume that c ≥ 0.878.
Truncated Exponential Distribution Let q∗ = 0.43 and consider an exponential distribution
such that v(q∗) = 1. Truncate the exponential distribution at q∗ with a uniform distribution over
[1, 1 + α] with α = 0.74. Hence, for q ∈ [q∗, 1], v(q) = ln qln q∗ ; for q ∈ [0, q∗], v(q) = 1 + α
(
1− qq∗
)
. It
is easy to check that the revenue is maximized at q = q∗ with maximal revenue q∗.
Next, we upper bound the expected revenue of b(v). Consider first the contribution from
quantiles q ∈ [1e , 1]. The analysis is similar to that of Dexp, except that the values are scaled up by
− 1ln q∗ . So this part contributes
− 1
ln q∗
∫ 1
q∗
−qc ln qcdq = − 1
ln q∗
c
(c+ 1)2
(
1− (q∗)c+1 + (q∗)c+1 ln(q∗)c+1
)
≤ 2.7556 c
(c+ 1)2
(
1− (q∗)c+1 + (q∗)c+1 ln(q∗)c+1
)
q∗ .
Now consider the quantiles that are smaller than q∗ and have values at most 1c , i.e., the corre-
sponding reserve price is smaller than 1. These are quantiles q ∈ [ cα+c−1cα q∗, q∗]. We upper bound
the expected revenue by the optimal revenue q∗ when the sampled quantile is in this interval. So
this part contributes at most(
q∗ − cα+ c− 1
cα
q∗
)
q∗ =
(
1− c
cα
)
(q∗)2 ≤ 0.5811
(
1
c
− 1
)
q∗ .
Finally, consider quantiles q ∈ [0, cα+c−1cα q∗]. The corresponding value is v(q) = 1 + α
(
1 − qq∗
)
and the reserve price is b(v) = c
(
1 + α
(
1 − qq∗
))
. The sale probability at this price is 1+α−b(v)α q
∗.
So this part contributes ∫ cα+c−1
cα
q∗
0
b(v)
1 + α− b(v)
α
q∗dq.
Note that db(v) = − cαq∗ dq, b = 1 when q = cα+c−1cα q∗, and b = c(1 + α) when q = 0. So the above
equals
(q∗)2
cα2
∫ c(1+α)
0
b(v)(1 + α− b(v))db(v) = (q
∗)2
cα2
(
1 + α
2
((
c(1 + α)
)2 − 1)− 1
3
((
c(1 + α)
)3 − 1))
=
(q∗)2
cα2
((
c2
2
− c
3
3
)
(1 + α)3 − 1 + α
2
+
1
3
)
≤
(
−1.3789c2 + 2.0683c− 0.42151
c
)
q∗.
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Putting everything together and dividing the expected revenue by the optimal revenue q∗, the
approximation ratio is at most
2.7556
c
(c+ 1)2
(
1−(q∗)c+1+(q∗)c+1 ln(q∗)c+1
)
+0.5811
(
1
c
− 1
)
+
(
−1.3768c2 + 2.2683c− 0.42151
c
)
.
We numerically maximize the above function over c ∈ [0.878, 1]. It is decreasing in the interval
[0.878, 1] and takes value about 0.6762 at c = 0.878. So the lemma follows for linear pricing
functions.
Continuously Differentiable Pricing Functions Next, we explain how to reduce the case
of a continuously differentiable pricing function to the linear pricing function case. Since b(v)
is continuously differentiable, for any δ > 0, there exists  > 0 such that for any v ∈ [0, ],
|b′(v) − b′(0)| < δ, i.e., in this neighborhood of 0, b(v) behaves like a linear function with slope
approximately b′(0) (up to error δ). So we can handle them like the linear case.
Formally, if b′(0) < 12 , then b(v) ≤ (12 + δ)v for v ≤ . So its approximation ratio w.r.t. a point
mass at v is at most 12 + δ < 0.677 for sufficiently small δ.
Next, assume b′(0) > 12 . Let us scale down the values in the exponential distribution and the
truncated exponential distribution from the linear case such that all values are less than .12 For
any sampled value v, the expected revenue is b(v)q(b(v)) where (f ′(0)− δ)v < b(v) < (f ′(0) + δ)v.
So
b(v)q(b(v)) ≤ (f ′(0) + δ)vq((f ′(0)− δ)v) = f
′(0) + δ
f ′(0)− δ (f
′(0)− δ)vq((f ′(0)− δ)v) ,
which is at most f
′(0)+δ
f ′(0)−δ times larger than the revenue of linear pricing function (f
′(0)− δ)v. The
lemma then follows by f ′(0) ≥ 12 and letting δ goes to zero.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. By previous arguments, it suffices to consider only (deterministic) pricing
functions with p(v) ≤ v for all v. We consider a distribution over value distributions. Draw λ from
an exponential distribution with parameter γ, i.e., the density of λ is γe−γλ, where γ is a parameter
to be determined later. Let the value distribution to be an exponential distribution with parameter
λ, i.e., the density of v is λe−λv.
We first compute the best response pricing algorithm p(v) subject to p(v) ≤ v for this case.
The expected revenue of p(v) is
R =
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
λe−λvp(v)e−λp(v)dv
]
γe−γλdλ
= γ
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
λe−λ(v+p(v)+γ)p(v)dλ
]
dv
= γ
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
λe−λ(v+p(v)+γ)p(v)dλ
]
dv
= γ
∫ ∞
0
[
p(v)
v + p(v) + γ
∫ ∞
0
(v + p(v) + γ)λe−λ(v+p(v)+γ)dλ
]
dv
= γ
∫ ∞
0
p(v)
(v + p(v) + γ)2
dv.
12Note that the support of the exponential distribution spans all non-negative real numbers. So instead of scaling
to make all values smaller than , we will make sure 1− 10−5 fraction of the values are smaller than ; the remaining
values can change the approximation ratio by at most 10−5.
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Note that p(v)
(v+p(v)+γ)2
is maximized at p(v) = v for p(v) ≤ v. So the best response is p(v) = v.
Given any λ, the optimal revenue is 1eλ , and the expected revenue of p(v) = v is
1
4λ . So the
approximation ratio is at most e4 ≈ 0.68, as desired.
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